Not-Self, Generic Subjective Continuity, & Justice As Fairness

Integrating the Insights of Sakyamuni, Thomas W. Clark, & John Rawls

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John Rawls famously argues for his justice as fairness on the basis of a simple thought experiment. Imagine that you are given the opportunity to choose what sort of society you are to be born into before birth. You are placed behind a “veil of ignorance” so that you do not know what family you will be born into, whether or not you’ll have any disabilities, etc. You will want to choose a society in which the people who are worst off are best off. You may prefer to maximize your chances of being born into a decent position by choosing a society in which there is little inequality, but there may theoretically be instances where you would choose a less egalitarian society over a more egalitarian one. If the inequality that exists is such that it creates more productivity and ends up also making the people who are worst off better off than they would have been under purely egalitarian conditions, then some inequality would be tolerable and, indeed, preferable. Rawls makes the case that we need to ensure that the worst off are better off. He does this by erasing our differences through a thought experiment that places us “behind a veil of ignorance.” We are told to examine the world without knowing what our position in the world is or will be. By artificially putting one into a position where they realize that they may end up being the individual that is the worst off, they are forced to identify themself with that person (or, at least, forced to assume that that person may be them).

Thomas Clark introduces the concept of generic subjective continuity. He points out that we have a personal subjective continuity throughout our lives. When we go to sleep or sustain a head injury, we may have a lapse in consciousness. When we regain consciousness, there is a sense of continuity. We identify with our consciousness such that we would not regard our “self” after waking up as being different from our “self” before sleeping. Although there is a break in our personal subjective continuity, there is still a sense of continuity when consciousness resumes. Now, assume that you are in an accident that causes you to have amnesia and forget everything about yourself and your life. When you wake up after the accident, you are basically a new person but wouldn’t you still identify with that new person. Wouldn’t you want the new person you are after the accident to be happy and to not suffer? Of course, you would. If your memories came back and your sense of being “you” from before the incident returns, you’d still have a continuity with the not-you that you were when you had amnesia, so you wouldn’t want that not-you to have been in pain and suffering. But what if the amnesia was permanent? The physical body and our memories (recorded in the physical organ of the brain) are what makes us have a sense of personal subjective continuity. But, if my memories, tastes, preferences, and dispositions are all downloaded into a computer and transferred to a robotic body, is the new robotic me still me? There is a sense of personal continuity that I believe takes place as an illusory phenomenon that emerges as a result of consciousness sharing the same body and memories over time. But there is no real self that persists from moment to moment. The illusion of self is the result of identifying consciousness with our memories and our physical body. If we distinguish consciousness from our physical body and our memories, then we can begin to think about a generic subjective continuity. If I am the last conscious entity in the universe and I die, consciousness will cease. But imagine another being with consciousness is born a million years after my death. Consciousness resumes. Is the break in consciousness really any different from the break in consciousness that occurs if I have an accident and permanently forget who I am and must live as a new person after the amnesia? I don’t think it really is. Rather than amnesia and dementia showing that a person ceases to be their self and starts being a new person when their memories are lost, I think it shows that the idea of “self” is illusory. It is not my body that makes me me. It is not my memories that make me me. There is no me. The point of consciousness simply identifies with these things and, by clinging to them, creates the illusion of self. If the self is illusory, then there is no real case for distinguishing my experience of consciousness from the experience of consciousness by any other sentient creature. The next being born after me shares in consciousness and is essentially identical to me insofar as we share the same essenceless or anātmanic nature.

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What we are getting at is something like a secular Buddhist concept of rebirth. The Buddha adopted the language of reincarnation as a metaphor for life after death, but the Buddhist concept of life after death is fundamentally different from the Hindu concept of reincarnation. A core doctrine of Buddhism is anātman (not-self), the idea that the self or the soul is an illusion. Thus, rebirth in the Buddhist sense must be fundamentally different from the Hindu conception insofar as there is no soul or self to be reincarnated. It is not the soul that continues after death, but consciousness, life, and karmic reaction (the effects of one’s actions). In Greek mythology, the deceased must drink from the river of forgetfulness before they can be reincarnated. The self that continues from life to life, even under the traditional reincarnation doctrine, is more a generic consciousness than a consciousness tied to a particular body or a set of memories. This doctrine of the reincarnate soul borders on something like generic subjective continuity, such that the notions of self versus not-self blur together. The not-self and generic subjective continuity ideas, in my estimation, are more correct than the reincarnation position, insofar as the reincarnation position still assumes that there is some specific personal identity (self) transferred between births although the essence of the soul remains vague and undefined. In reality, the essence of the soul is illusion — there is no there there!

Ted Bolha has pointed out that this idea of generic subjective continuity (which, in my mind, I identify with the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth), has moral implications. I would not want to wake up tomorrow with amnesia and be suffering. I can even recognize that the personal subjective continuity — or illusory perception of self — will have been broken, but I would not wish for this other me with amnesia to suffer. I could only wish that this new me be happy and free from suffering. Yet, the break in personal subjective continuity here is no different than if we were not talking about a new me in the same body but an entirely independent instance of consciousness in some unrelated sentient being. Logically, I ought not to see my “self” as any different from those who are born after me. I ought to wish the best for all sentient beings insofar as we share the same essence — consciousness.

This idea of generic subjective continuity can strengthen the case for Rawlsian justice as fairness. Rawls uses his “veil of ignorance” to erase the differences that separate us. However, not-self and generic subjective continuity can actually create an even stronger case for identifying one’s self with the other. It can make a case for identifying my consciousness with the consciousness of all other sentient beings, thereby reinforcing the Rawlsian argument. It can be used to make an objective case for what is suggested by Rawls’ thought experiment. Behind the veil of ignorance, it’s still selfish self-interest that is motivating me to choose equality or fairness. With generic subjective continuity, it’s not just that I don’t know which position I will find myself in (e.g. whether I will be born rich or born poor) and, therefore, I must wager based on what gives me the best odds of relative wellbeing; but rather it is that I can in some sense actually identify with all other subjects who experience consciousness (both rich and poor) and, therefore, ought to want everyone to be as well-off as possible regardless of what position I will be in. We don’t need a veil-of-ignorance thought experiment to make us sympathize with the plight of the poor; we just need to realize that we are objectively no different. I ought to put myself in the shoes of the worst off not because I’m behind a veil of ignorance but because I realize that there is no objective basis for distinguishing between my self and the other.