Objectivist Buddhism?
Reconciling the ideas of Ayn Rand and Nagarjuna
Introduction
Ayn Rand’s Objectivism and Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka represent two of the most rigorous metaphysical and ethical systems in world philosophy — one rooted in Western rational individualism, the other in Buddhist emptiness and dependent origination. Rand grounds her philosophy in the metaphysical axiom that “existence exists” (i.e. reality is real) and builds an ethics of rational self-interest as the moral expression of life’s nature. Nāgārjuna, by contrast, dismantles all claims to inherent existence (svabhāva), revealing that all things — including the self — arise dependently and are therefore empty (śūnya) of any essential self or concrete essence.
While these positions appear opposed — one affirming the autonomous self, the other denying it — the Buddhist doctrine of the Two Truths (conventional vs. ultimate) offers a framework for reconciliation. Rand’s individual, rational self can be interpreted as conventionally real, while Nāgārjuna’s “not-self” describes the ultimate truth that the self and all phenomena lack independent being. Read together, they reveal not contradiction but complementarity: Rand articulates the self’s integrity within human existence; Nāgārjuna reveals the emptiness that grounds that integrity in interdependence.
Rand’s Metaphysical Individualism
Rand’s philosophy begins with three axioms: existence, consciousness, and identity. “Existence exists — and the act of grasping that statement implies two corollary axioms: that something exists which one perceives and that one exists possessing consciousness” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 4–5). From this, she infers that “A is A”: every entity possesses identity, and consciousness is the faculty that perceives this fact.
In Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Leonard Peikoff clarifies that these axioms are not arbitrary assumptions but “perceptual self-evidencies” — the foundations of knowledge and moral action (Peikoff, Objectivism, ch. 1). On this metaphysical base, Rand constructs her ethics: life itself is the standard of value, and reason is the means by which man sustains his life. “Man’s life,” she writes, “is the standard of moral value, and his own happiness is the moral purpose of his life” (The Virtue of Selfishness, 27).
Rand’s concept of rational selfishness is thus not hedonistic egoism but the moral recognition that one’s life and mind are one’s ultimate responsibility. The self here is not a metaphysical substance but a functioning consciousness engaged with reality. For Rand, selfhood is both objective and ethical: the individual is an independent, rational agent whose proper function is to perceive existence accurately and act in accordance with that truth.
Nāgārjuna’s Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Self
Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), by contrast, begins with the Buddha’s principle of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda): “Whatever is dependently arisen, that is explained to be emptiness” (MMK 24:18). As Garfield notes, this is “the identity of dependent origination and emptiness: to be empty is to exist only dependently” (Garfield, Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, p. 69). Nāgārjuna’s central aim is not to deny existence, but to deny inherent existence — to show that all things, including the self, lack independent essence (svabhāva) and exist only in relation.
Dependent arising (Sanskrit: pratītyasamutpāda; Pali: paṭicca-samuppāda) is the Buddhist principle that all phenomena arise in dependence upon causes and conditions — nothing exists on its own or from itself. Every event, thought, or object comes into being only because other factors make it possible, and when those conditions cease, the phenomenon also ceases.
In its simplest formulation, the Buddha described it as: “When this exists, that comes to be; when this ceases, that ceases.” For example, a seed grows into a tree only with soil, water, sunlight, and time; a thought arises only when sensory input, memory, and attention coincide. This principle applies universally — to physical things, mental states, and even to the sense of self.
Nāgārjuna deepens this idea in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā by equating dependent arising with emptiness (śūnyatā): because everything depends on other things, nothing possesses its own independent or inherent nature (svabhāva). Thus, the world is not made of self-contained substances but of interrelated processes. Understanding dependent arising reveals the “middle way” between eternalism (believing in permanent essences) and nihilism (denying reality altogether): things exist, but only through their dependence on everything else.
In David Kalupahana’s translation, Nāgārjuna’s “Examination of Self” (MMK 18) argues that if the self existed intrinsically, it would be immutable and independent; but since experience reveals continual change and interdependence, the self cannot exist as a permanently abiding substance. “If the self were the same as the aggregates, it would have arising and ceasing; if different, it would not have the characteristics of the aggregates” (MMK 18:1).
In Buddhist philosophy, what we call a “self” or “person” (ātman) is understood instead as a composite of five aggregates (pañca skandha), which together account for all aspects of human experience. The first is form (rūpa), the material body and physical sense faculties. Form cannot be the self because it is constantly changing — the body grows, decays, and depends on countless external conditions such as food and temperature. The second aggregate is feeling (vedanā), the raw sensations of pleasure, pain, or neutrality that arise through contact with the world. Feelings come and go from moment to moment, so they cannot constitute a permanent “I.” The third is perception (saṃjñā), the process of recognizing and labeling things. Perception, too, is unstable and conditioned by prior experiences and expectations; when perception changes, we say “my perception changed,” implying it is something one has, not what one is. The fourth aggregate, mental formations (saṃskāra), includes thoughts, intentions, emotions, and habits — the entire volitional and psychological dimension of life. These mental states arise from causes and vanish as conditions shift, so they cannot represent an enduring self either. Finally, consciousness (vijñāna) refers to the momentary awareness that arises with sensory or mental contact. Consciousness depends on both an object and a sense faculty; it flickers continuously, giving the illusion of a stable witness where there is only a stream of events.
Taken together, these aggregates describe all that we experience, yet none of them — whether considered individually or in combination — is permanent, self-sustaining, or truly independent. Because each aggregate is impermanent and arises through dependent origination, none can serve as a fixed essence or soul. As Nāgārjuna points out in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (XVIII.1–2), if the self were identical with the aggregates, it would come and go as they do; but if it were separate from them, it would have no characteristics or reality of its own. Thus, the self cannot be found either within or apart from the aggregates. What we conventionally call “a person” is simply the interplay of these five processes — a dynamic, conditioned flow that functions coherently but lacks any permanent or independent self-nature.
Nāgārjuna’s logic of śūnyatā (emptiness) thus serves to expose conceptual reification. It does not negate the everyday self — the person who thinks, acts, and suffers — but clarifies that such a self exists only conventionally. The denial of svabhāva is therefore a denial of absolutism, not of reality. As Garfield summarizes, “emptiness is not nonexistence but the lack of intrinsic nature” (ibid., 91).
The Two Truths as a Framework for Reconciliation
Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the Two Truths — saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth) and paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth) — provides a bridge between his view and Rand’s. At the conventional level, things exist and function; moral discourse, perception, and reasoning all occur meaningfully. At the ultimate level, these same things are empty of inherent nature, arising dependently and lacking self-subsistent essence.
This distinction allows a synthesis: Rand’s “self,” grounded in rational cognition and moral agency, belongs to the conventional truth. As a conscious, causally efficacious being, the Randian individual is conventionally real — much like the Buddhist pudgala (person) that exists dependently on the five aggregates (skandhas). Nāgārjuna does not deny this empirical reality; he only denies its ultimate independence.
In this sense, Rand’s metaphysical realism and Nāgārjuna’s emptiness are complementary. Rand’s existence exists corresponds to the affirmation of conventional reality; Nāgārjuna’s śūnyatā corresponds to the insight that this reality is devoid of self-subsistence. To say that “existence exists” and to say that “existence is empty” are not contradictory but refer to two levels of discourse: the first asserts that there is a world; the second describes how it exists — relationally, contingently, dependently.
The Ethical Self: Between Rational Agency and Emptiness
Rand’s virtue of selfishness rests on the idea that the individual must be the beneficiary of his own actions. “Man — every man — is an end in himself, not the means to the ends of others” (The Virtue of Selfishness, 30). From the Buddhist standpoint, this ethical individualism can be understood as a skillful means (upāya) — a necessary convention for beings who experience the world through the illusion of individuality.
Nāgārjuna’s ultimate teaching does not deny ethical action; rather, it purifies it of attachment to ego. In the MMK 24, he explains that misunderstanding emptiness leads to nihilism, but properly understood, it “makes all things possible.” Compassion and moral responsibility arise from realizing that one’s actions are inextricable from all others — that the self and the world co-arise.
Seen through this lens, Rand’s insistence on integrity, independence, and reason can be reinterpreted as the cultivation of clarity within the conventional self. To live rationally is to recognize causal interdependence — that denial of conventional reality leads to destruction. The Buddhist would add: this reality itself is interdependent and impermanent, so the wise person acts without attachment.
Thus, Rand’s “selfishness” and Nāgārjuna’s “selflessness” describe different aspects of the same moral insight: awareness and responsibility. Rand’s hero acts from rational self-knowledge; the Bodhisattva acts from wisdom that sees no self to defend. Both reject the irrationality of desire divorced from reality.
Toward a Unified Ontology
In metaphysical terms, Rand’s identity and Nāgārjuna’s emptiness converge. For Rand, “to be is to be something” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 7). For Nāgārjuna, “there is not the slightest thing that is not dependently arisen, and therefore not empty” (MMK 24:19). Both assert that what exists does so in accordance with its nature — not as a formless void but as a determinate, relational being. Rand’s A is A finds its dialectical counterpart in Nāgārjuna’s “negations” — both reject contradiction and affirm intelligibility.
The difference lies in emphasis: Rand takes the entity as primary, Nāgārjuna the relation. Yet both oppose the same error — the detachment of thought from reality. Rand’s critique of “mysticism and skepticism” in Peikoff’s Objectivism parallels Nāgārjuna’s critique of “eternalism and annihilationism.” Both warn against the two extremes: asserting an unchanging essence (the soul) or denying all reality (nihilism). The Middle Way, like Rand’s rational realism, holds to the principle that things are what they are — neither nothing nor self-sufficient.
The synthesis of Rand and Nāgārjuna yields a two-tiered vision of the self.
- Conventional level: The self exists as a rational, conscious individual — the moral center of agency and responsibility. Rand’s ethics of rational self-interest articulates this level with precision, affirming the dignity of human reason.
- Ultimate level: The self lacks inherent existence; it is a nexus of causes and conditions. Nāgārjuna’s emptiness dissolves the metaphysical absolutism of ego, revealing selfhood as a luminous process rather than a permanent essence.
In this light, Rand’s injunction to live for one’s own sake and Nāgārjuna’s call to relinquish attachment are not opposites but stages of the same awakening. To live by reason, in Rand’s sense, is to live in harmony with dependent origination. To realize not-self, in Nāgārjuna’s sense, is to see that even reason and will are interdependent phenomena — and that ethical life, properly understood, flows from clarity rather than clinging.
Ayn Rand’s epistemology centers on what she calls context-keeping, the discipline of recognizing that every concept, judgment, or moral conclusion is valid only within the total framework of knowledge from which it is derived. As she writes in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, “Knowledge is contextual,” meaning that truth is not an isolated fragment but part of an integrated hierarchy of understanding. A concept torn from its context ceases to represent reality accurately. For Rand, the mind must constantly “keep the context” — to remember the web of relationships that gives any idea meaning, to see that knowledge depends on prior integrations, and to recognize that one’s conclusions are valid only insofar as they remain connected to the total structure of facts and reasoning that supports them.
Seen through a Buddhist lens, Rand’s idea of context-keeping echoes the principle of dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda). Just as no phenomenon exists independently of conditions, no act of knowing stands apart from the network of premises, perceptions, and integrations that sustain it. To know something fully is to perceive it in relation — to understand how it arises from, and contributes to, the larger order of existence. Context-keeping, in this light, becomes an epistemic form of interdependence: it acknowledges that every truth is true because of its place within a system of causes, relationships, and prior knowledge. Where Buddhism expresses this in ontological terms — that things exist only dependently — Rand expresses it in cognitive terms — that knowledge exists only contextually. Both reject the possibility of isolated absolutes: for Rand, a “floating abstraction”; for Nāgārjuna, a “self-existent essence.” In each case, reality and understanding are intelligible only as interrelated wholes.
The Significance of the Self and Not-Self Doctrines
The dialogue between Rand’s self and Nāgārjuna’s not-self ultimately reaches its fullest expression not in metaphysics but in lived experience. Rand’s concept of the rational, volitional self emphasizes agency, purpose, and the capacity to shape one’s own life. To see oneself as an independent, reasoning being — rather than a passive product of circumstance — is profoundly empowering. It encourages focus, discipline, and the pursuit of value in work, creativity, and love. Psychologically, this sense of self is stabilizing: it gives coherence to one’s actions and provides a locus of responsibility. The Randian individual is not a helpless passenger in the stream of causes but a conscious navigator, able to choose and to direct effort toward rational goals. In the day-to-day world, this conception supports confidence, resilience, and moral integrity — the sense that one’s choices matter because one’s life is one’s own project.
Nāgārjuna’s not-self teaching, by contrast, addresses a different but equally essential dimension of human life — the inevitability of change, loss, and dissolution. Where Rand’s self empowers the will to live, anātman soothes the fear of perishing. Recognizing that the “I” is not a fixed entity but a constellation of causes and conditions allows a person to meet sickness, aging, and even mental instability with compassion rather than despair. If one’s mind or body falters, it is not that a permanent “I” has failed, but that transient conditions have changed. This view gently loosens the grip of self-blame and existential panic. The same insight into impermanence also transforms the contemplation of death: since there was never a static self to defend, there is nothing solid to lose. To understand not-self is to understand that life and death are two phases in a continuous unfolding of conditions — the wave returning to the ocean, not a being falling into nothingness.
In this way, the two perspectives form a psychological dialectic. Rand’s self provides the strength to act within the human sphere — to build, to create, to assert the moral worth of one’s existence. Nāgārjuna’s not-self provides the serenity to accept that all creations, including one’s own body and personality, will eventually pass away. The Randian self is a posture of engagement; the Buddhist not-self is a posture of release. One gives the courage to live deliberately; the other gives the wisdom to let go gracefully. Together, they suggest a balanced human maturity: to live as if one’s choices mattered absolutely, yet to remember that the chooser, too, is impermanent — a passing pattern of awareness in the vast interdependent web of being.
References
- Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness (New York: Signet, 1964).
- Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (New York: Meridian, 1990).
- Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (New York: Penguin, 1993).
- Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, trans. Jay L. Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
- Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, trans. David J. Kalupahana, The Philosophy of the Middle Way (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991).
