Progress & Conservation: A Radical Centrist Manifesto
The Essence of Conservatism & of Progressivism
Here I am concerned with conservatism and progressivism as broad tendencies. I am not referring to particular schools of thought as much as to broad trends and dispositions associated with the opposite ends of the political spectrum.
The essence of conservatism is its recognition of the importance of stability, security, and social order. It views revolution and insurrection as bad because these things disrupt social order. During revolutions, people die; and human lives are irreplaceable. The insecurity and instability of revolution disturb the peace, causes anxiety, and bring suffering and death to many people. Thus, conservatives have very strict criteria for justifying revolution, and they hold that democratic reform is usually preferable to revolution. In a monarchical despotism, revolution may be the only option, but in a democratic society we must consider revolution as a last resort.
Conservatism also emphasizes the imperfectability of human nature. Humans are fallible and corruptible. Therefore, we need checks and balances on power. No one individual or faction should ever be given too much unchecked power. Furthermore, conservatism recognizes that existing institutions are the result of social evolution. They reflect the wisdom of our ancestors and, therefore, may contain purposes and functions that are quite needed but not readily apparent to us. We must tread lightly when overhauling existing institutions. Before we engage in any major reform, we must seriously examine what we are overhauling â we must try to determine what the purpose is and what the consequences of overturning it will be. Sometimes it is best to be cautious about overturning existing institutions too quickly, since they may actually serve a necessary function that we are simply unaware of.
The essence of progressivism is the recognition of socioeconomic injustices and the desire to change them. Progressives desire more egalitarian (equalitarian) arrangements because they believe that such arrangements will lead to a happier and more prosperous society. They believe that all people ought to be guaranteed a certain minimum standard of living, so long as this does not deprive others of this same standard. Often, progressives have favored revolution as a means of bringing about these desired social changes.
Additionally, progressivism recognizes that many human vices stem from social and economic conditions. If you are raised in a society where greed is rewarded and altruism is shunned, then you will be inclined towards vice rather than virtue. If you are so poor that theft has become a means of survival, then being a law-abiding citizen is not a reasonable path for you. If you are so destitute that you turn to drugs and alcohol as a means of escaping the harsh realities of life â or if you are so oppressed that you turn to drugs and alcohol to relieve your physical or psychological pain â then vice is not your fault as much as the fault of the society into which you were born. Thus, social and economic reform is a necessary prerequisite for making better and more virtuous citizens. Progressives also recognize that certain institutions were created in order to advance the cause of certain privileged groups, and some institutions even emerged as a result of ignorance and prejudice. The institution of slavery is such an institution. Such unjust institutions really need to be overturned immediately.
These ideas are not totally in conflict with one another. Conservatism and progressivism are merely orientations or dispositions, rather than ideologies proper. Extremist conservatives, like Plato, would like to arrest change altogether or, like Rushdoony, would like to turn back the clock and undo the progress that has already been made. Extremist progressives, like the insurrectionary anarchists, would like to destroy the existing order altogether in order to rebuild from scratch or, like Marx, would like to take over the reins of power in order to totally alter all social institutions. But not all people are extremists. Some people are more moderate. And there is room for synthesis. Conservatism does not have to reject change and reform altogether and progressivism does not have to reject the idea of implementing changes through reform rather than revolution. Thus, there are progressive conservatives and conservative progressives. These individuals are what you would call centrists.
A centrist is basically someone that advocates social change but does not advocate revolution or insurrectionary violence. A centrist is someone that opposes injustice and seeks social change through democratic reform. A centrist is someone that advocates non-violent civil disobedience and protest rather than insurrection and vandalism as a means of achieving social change. Centrists see electoral politics, civil disobedience, and a variety of other non-insurrectionary tactics as the most appropriate means of achieving social change within the context of a democratic society. Centrism recognizes the valid insights of both conservatism (the right) and progressivism (the left), synthesizing the two views and thereby positioning itself in the middle of the political spectrum rather than at either extreme.
The Convergent Evolution of Ideologies
In the 20th Century, we witnessed a strange convergence of competing ideologies. Various political ideologies began to converge around a certain vision of liberal democracy and social welfare. This vision was not usually put in the forefront of public discussion â the divisive differences were vocally debated, but the core agreements from all sides were never mentioned. A new socioeconomic model had emerged, but nobody really took notice or bothered to recognize that the various political factions were mostly in agreement on certain essential points. Intellectuals on all sides had concluded: (1) that we needed a robust market system with free trade but not laissez-faire, (2) that representative democracy is the only viable model for a free society, (3) that a social safety net is a necessary component of a free society, (4) that some degree of redistribution of wealth is both desirable and necessary, and (5) that progress and change is necessary and desirable and ought not to be arrested but that the preservation of social order and existing institutions during transition is of utmost importance. Essentially, all of the worldâs intellectuals reached a consensus in advocating liberal democracy with a social safety net. The âwelfare stateâ idea wasnât left or right: it was centrist, moderate â progressivism hinged with a bit of conservatism. The leading intellectuals of all the most important political traditions converged upon an overlapping consensus (to borrow a term from Rawls)âthey all came to agree upon the fundamental features that the basic structure of a polity must have in order to meet the criterion of justice.
Society As Guarantor of Basic Welfare: Social Insurance & the Social Safety Net
The welfare state idea is often associated with social democracy and âsocialism,â but the reality is that the welfare state idea finds its roots (though not its full expression) in classical republicanism, in the works of individuals like Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson. Later, the welfare state was pushed by people like Otto von Bismarck as a counter-socialist program. Socialism advocated government-ownership of industry and a centrally planned economy. The worsening condition of the working class under industrial capitalism was pushing the masses towards rebellion. The working populace was jumping on board with the ideas of socialist revolutionaries. Bismarck created the first welfare state as a means of preventing the socialist revolution from coming. Marx himself opposed social welfare programs because he thought that they would prevent the impoverishment of the workers upon which the socialist revolution was predicated. But more recently, socialists like Anthony Crosland ended up embracing the welfare state idea as an anti-capitalist measure, as a bit of a compromise in a left-leaning direction. The welfare state was neither a left-wing or a right-wing idea, but rather a compromise â a pragmatic and realistic response to real problems. There was a dialectic between the right (conservatives) and the far left (socialists) and a consensus emerged: society needed to guarantee a minimum standard of living to all. The welfare state was not the product of either side as much as a consensus reached by both sides.
Liberal democracy and the open society had fostered liberal dialogue. Contentious debate and political struggle in the realm of electoral politics and congressional/parliamentary deliberation led to the emergence of a âradical centristâ compromise. After discussion and deliberation, a new ideal emerged. The welfare state ideal emerged as a new concept, but a concept that transcended the dialectic and really was better than either the thesis (conservatism) or antithesis (socialism). The key proponents of both capitalism and socialism began to advocate this new synthesis as their ideal, their vision of utopia. The end result was that various leading intellectuals from all sides ended up spreading the new consensus. John Rawls (the most prominent liberal intellectual), F. A. Hayek and Milton Friedman (the leading libertarian thinkers), Winston Churchill (the leader of the Conservative Party), and both Anthony Crosland and Anthony Giddens (the leading social democratic theorists) all converged on the consensus that a welfare state based on universal social insurance is a necessary component of any free and open society. This means that a free society must have a social safety net to provide a social minimum to all, and this would include cash transfers to the poor and a guarantee of access to healthcare for those who cannot afford it.
Just to substantiate the claim that such an âoverlapping consensusâ exists, here are some excerpts from the writings of the leading intellectuals of these various traditions:
âThe assurance of a certain minimum income for everyone, or a sort of floor below which nobody need fall even when he is unable to provide for himself, appears not only to be a wholly legitimate protection against a risk common to all, but a necessary part of the Great Society in which the individual no longer has specific claims on the members of the particular small group into which he was born.â â F. A. Hayek (Law, Legislation, & Liberty, volume 3)
âThere is no reason why in a society which has reached the general level of wealth which ours has attained the first kind of security [i.e. security against severe physical privation, the certainty of a given minimum of sustenance for all] should not be guaranteed to all without endangering general freedomâŚ.
âNor is there any reason why the state should not assist the individuals in providing for those common hazards of life against which, because of their uncertainty, few individuals can make adequate provision. Where, as in the case of sickness and accident, neither the desire to avoid such calamities nor the efforts to overcome their consequences are as a rule weakened by the provision of assistance â where, in short, we deal with genuinely insurable risks â the case for the stateâs helping to organize a comprehensive system of social insurance in providing for those common hazards of life against which few can make adequate provision.â â F. A. Hayek (The Road to Serfdom)âThe Welfare State or paternalist tradition: [socialism entails] the rejection of the laissez-faire doctrine that the state has no obligation to its citizens (save for the protection of property), and indeed a positive obligation to remain inactive: and the affirmation of the opposite view, that the state must accept responsibility for preventing poverty and distress, and for providing at least a subsistence minimum of aid to such citizens as need it.â â Anthony Crosland (The Future of Socialism)
âIt can be argued that private charity is insufficient⌠I am distressed by the sight of poverty; I am benefitted by its alleviationâŚ.
âSuppose one accepts, as I do, this line of reasoning as justifying governmental action to alleviate poverty; to set, as it were, a floor under the standard of life of every person in the community. There remains the questions, how much and howâŚ.
âThe arrangement that recommends itself on purely mechanical grounds is a negative income tax [a type of minimum income guarantee]. â â Milton Friedman (Capitalism and Freedom)âA more radical reform would, first, end both Medicare and Medicaid, at least for new entrants, and replace them by providing every family in the United States with catastrophic insurance (i.e., a major medical policy with a high deductible). Second, it would end tax exemption of employer-provided medical care. And, third, it would remove the restrictive regulations that are now imposed on medical insurance â hard to justify with universal catastrophic insurance.
âThis reform would solve the problem of the currently medically uninsured, eliminate most of the bureaucratic structure, free medical practitioners from an increasingly heavy burden of paperwork and regulation, and lead many employers and employees to convert employer-provided medical care into a higher cash wage. The taxpayer would save money because total government costs would plummet. The family would be relieved of one of its major concerns â the possibility of being impoverished by a major medical catastrophe â and most could readily finance the remaining medical costs.â â Milton Friedman (How to Cure Health Care)
Subsidiarity, the âThird Sector,â & Social Welfare
The proponents of this âwelfare state,â from William Beveridge to John Rawls, all rejected the label. As Anthony Giddens observed, some of the most robust âwelfare statesâ are really not properly welfare states but rather welfare societies.
âThe system Bismarck created in Germany is usually taken as the classic form of the welfare state. Yet the welfare state in Germany has always had a complex network of third sector groups and associations that the authorities have depended on for putting welfare policies in practice. The aim is to help these to attain their social objectives. In areas such as childcare, third sector groups have almost a monopoly on provision. The non-profit sector in Germany expanded rather than shrank as the welfare state grew. Welfare states vary in the degree to which they incorporate or rely upon the third sector. In Holland, for instance, non-profit organizations are the main delivery system for social services, while in Sweden hardly any are used. In Belgium and Austria, as in Germany, about half the social services are provided by non-profit groups.
âThe Dutch political scientist Kees van Kersbergen argues that âone of the major insights of the contemporary debate [about the welfare state] is that to equate social democracy and the welfare state may have been a mistake.â He examines in detail the influence of Christian democracy upon the development of Continental welfare systems and the social market. The Christian democratic parties descend from the Catholic parties that were important between the wars in Germany, Holland, Austria, and to a lesser degree France and Italy. The Catholic unionists saw socialism as the enemy and sought to outflank it on its own ground by stressing codetermination and class reconciliation. Ronald Reaganâs view, expressed in 1981, that âwe have let government take away those things that were once ours to do voluntarilyâ finds a much earlier echo in Europe in the Catholic tradition. Church, family and friends are the main sources of social solidarity. The state should step in only when those institutions donât fully live up to their obligationsâŚ.
âThe theme that the âwelfare stateâ should be replaced by the âwelfare societyâ has become a conventional one in the recent literature on welfare issues. Where third sector agencies are not already well represented, they should play a greater part in providing welfare services.â â Anthony Giddens (The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy, Ch. 4)
The Germanic social market economy was profoundly influenced by Catholic social teachings, a key component of which is subsidiarity. âSubsidiarity is an organizing principle that matters ought to be handled by the smallest, lowest or least centralized competent authority. Political decisions should be taken at a local level if possible, rather than by a central authority.â(Wikipedia) Subsidiarity is etymologically derived from the Latin term subsidium, which literally means âto sit behindâ and referred to relief, help, and assistance offered by larger military groups that would âsit backâ and only intervene if the troops sent in needed assistance â you donât send in the cavalry when the local authorities have everything under control! Alternatively, the term signifies that the agency in charge of providing for any need ought to be âseated downâ as close to the area of need as possible. The principle of subsidiarity holds that the legitimacy of more centralized institutions is predicated on the assistance that they provide to lower levels of organization and their subservience to lower levels of governance and organization.
The implication of the principle of subsidiarity means that the so-called âwelfare stateâ really is just a backup. It ought to first and foremost assist private charities and local communities in ensuring social welfare and eliminating poverty. The state should only intervene when local communities fail to eliminate poverty and ensure social welfare. Although the term subsidiarity is a more recent invention, the principle was present in classical republican thought. Thomas Jefferson suggested that the wards â the most local level of governance, which he argued ought to be directly democratic â ought to be responsible for âthe care of their own poor.â (Cf. Jefferson, To Samuel Kercheval, 1816) Then, with apparent approval, Jefferson remarks on the role that the parish, as a civil institution, held in colonial Virginia, noting how public revenue was used for welfare purposes:
âThe poor, unable to support themselves, are maintained by an assessment on the titheable persons in their parish. This assessment is levied and administered by twelve persons in each parish, called vestrymen, originally chosen by the housekeepers of each parish, but afterwards filling vacancies in their own body by their own choice. These are usually the most discreet farmers, so distributed through their parish, that every part of it may be under the immediate eye of some one of them. They are well acquainted with the details and economy of private life, and they find sufficient inducement to execute their charge well, in their philanthropy, in the approbation of their neighbors, and the distinction which that gives them. The poor who have neither property, friends, nor strength to labour, are boarded in the houses of good farmers, to whom a stipulated sum is annually paid. To those who are able to help themselves a little, or have friends from whom they derive some succours, inadequate however to their full maintenance, supplementary aids are given, which enable them to live comfortably in their own houses, or in the houses of their friends. Vagabonds, without visible property or vocation, are placed in workhouses, where they are well cloathed, fed, lodged, and made to labour. Nearly the same method of providing for the poor prevails through all our StatesâŚ.â â Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia [in Jefferson: Autobiography, Notes on the State of Virginia, Public and Private Papers, Addresses, Letters]
We see here a decentralized take on welfare provision, but Jefferson was not opposed to the provision of welfare by the federal government directly when necessary. Thomas Jefferson, along with John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, was a supporter of an early version of single-payer healthcare and of socialized medicine. In fact, in 1798, the Founding Fathers passed legislation that (1) established a mandatory payroll tax on privately employed sailors, which was to fund health insurance for those sailors, and (2) established government-owned hospitals at port cities. (Cf. Rick Ungar, Congress Passes Socialized Medicine and Mandates Health Insurance â In 1798 and Thomas Jefferson Also Supported Government Run Health Care)
Room For Disagreement
The convergent evolution of ideologies led to the emergence of an âoverlapping consensusâ among intellectuals. While the thinkers of various intellectual traditions had very different ideological worldviews and moral frameworks, they were all human beings with certain shared experiences and shared values, and this overlap was sufficient to lead to an overlapping consensus on the idea of what the âbasic structureâ of a just society would entail. Hayek and Friedman (the conservative libertarians) agreed with Rawls and Keynes (the liberals), Crosland (the socialist), and Giddens (the social democrat) when it came to the question of the basic structure of society. Intellectuals from all sides came to agree that the basic structure of society ought to (1) have a republican or representative democratic system, (2) allow for reform through democratic processes so that violent revolution is rendered unnecessary, (3) guarantee a certain social minimum to all â such that everyone has access to food, shelter, and healthcare and no one experiences poverty or need â , and (4) recognize that laissez-faire is not sufficient and that some social welfare measures on the part of the state, as well as some degree of redistribution, is necessary. Whether the social welfare measures ought to be minimal (Hayek, Friedman) or maximal (Crosland) was not agreed upon. Whether the redistribution should be moderately egalitarian (Hayek, Friedman) or extremely egalitarian (Crosland, Rawls) was also hotly debated. Nevertheless, there was an agreement about the basic structure of society and what it ought to look like.
Types of Centrism: Radical Centrism vs. Milquetoast Centrism
There are various types of centrists. There are people who are center-left and people who are center-right. Then there are milquetoast centrists and radical centrists. On the center right you have radical centrists like Noel Skelton, Hilaire Belloc, and G. K. Chesterton, but you also have milquetoast centrists like Norman Mailer and Larry Hogan. On the center left, you have radical centrists like Anthony Crosland, Anthony Giddens, John Rawls, Bernie Sanders, and Robert Reich, but you also have milquetoast centrists like Charles Peters, Hillary Clinton, and Barack Obama. What sets the radical centrist apart from the milquetoast centrist is that the radical centrist is not afraid to criticize the flawed system we have inherited â they are not afraid to criticize capitalism and the so-called âdemocracyâ that we have inherited from prior generations, and they will criticize it precisely because it departs from the ideal basic structure that a just society must have. The milquetoast centrist, while agreeing with the radical centrist on the ideal of the basic structure, is inclined to pretend that the basic structure in place is already the same as the basic structure demanded by justice when it clearly is not!
The milquetoast centrist will call for moderate reforms, but no reforms that change the basic structure of the socioeconomic and political system. The milquetoast centrist, then, is often a defender of the status quo in practice. The radical centrist, on the other hand, calls for radical reforms that go so far as to change the basic structure of the socioeconomic and political system. The radical centrist will push for moving towards ranked-choice voting, star voting, and participatory democracy. The radical centrist will push to implement universal healthcare and a minimum (or basic) income guarantee. The milquetoast centrist will reject such radical changes. To be clear â when I advocate centrism, I am advocating radical centrism!
Progressive Conservatism
I will not outline the ideas of progressive conservatism in detail, but I will point you in the direction of progressive conservative thinkers to which you can turn for more information. The greatest of progressive conservative thinkers are Noel Skelton, who championed the idea of âproperty-owning democracy,â and Hilaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton, who championed âdistributism.â There are also individuals like Friedman and Hayek, who are essentially progressive conservatives of sorts, but with a strong libertarian bent. Friedman and Hayek can technically be considered center-right neoliberals. You also have the âleft-conservatismâ of Norman Mailer, which is highly problematic in many ways but does fit into this category.
Conservative Progressivism
The greatest thinkers among the conservative progressives are Anthony Crosland and Anthony Giddens, the leading intellectuals of modern social democratic theory, and Charles Peters, the author of A Neo-Liberalâs Manifesto, which espouses a center-left variety of neoliberalism. A primary difference between the social democratic âconservative progressiveâ and the neoliberal âconservative progressiveâ is that the former wants universal social insurance schemes whereas the latter opposes such measures and prefers means-tested welfare â the former is more radical and the latter less so. Nevertheless, the lines between social democracy and neoliberalism often become blurred when you look closely at individual thinkers, such a Robert Reich or Anthony Giddens, who both seem to represent a point of convergence between the two schools of thought.
Property-Owning Democracy: Republican Distributism
Radical centrists on both sides have advocated property-owning democracy as an alternative to the false capitalism/socialism dichotomy. This idea was central both to the âconstructive conservatismâ of Noel Skelton and to the âpolitical liberalismâ of John Rawls. The idea of property-owning democracy is basically a combination of republicanism and distributism. A republican system of government is a representative democracy. A distributist economy is one in which private property is widely distributed.
Capitalism has private ownership concentrated into the hands of the few â most individuals do not own their own home but rent from a landlord (or rent from a bank via a mortgage) while the land/factories/machines used for producing wealth are mostly monopolized by a small clique of capitalists. Socialism, on the other hand, has ownership concentrated into the hands of the state. Both systems are opposed to widespread private ownership. Distributism is, put simply, an ownership economy. Property-owning democracy simply advocates both widespread distribution of ownership and representative democracy.
The term âproperty-owning democracyâ is a relatively recent invention, but the concept was already present in the works of classical republican thinkers like Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine. Jefferson and Paine both held that widespread distribution of ownership is necessary to maintain a democratic society. If a few individuals own most of the land and resources and the majority of people are deprived of ownership, then a society cannot be truly democratic. Wealth is power and the wealthy will use their power to influence the political arena. If some people are rich enough that they can buy politicians, then no semblance of true democracy is possible. Thus, republicanism requires widespread distribution of ownership. Politically, democracy does not work in a society with extreme inequality.
Furthermore, as proponents of liberal democracy, radical centrists have always been advocates of the market system. One of the greatest arguments for the market system is that it is democratic. There is a certain âdemocracy of the marketâ that allows one to vote with their dollars. If you donât like this business, you are free to support their competition. However, there are several factors that prevent any sort of market democracy in the real world. In order to be allowed to vote with your dollars, there must be sufficient alternative options. If one company has a monopoly, then the democracy of the marketplace falls apart. This makes a free-market case for anti-trust laws. Additionally, Abba Lerner notes that the democracy of the market implies that every dollar is a vote. The market can only be democratic, then, if the votes are relatively evenly distributed throughout the economy. If one individual has enough votes to manipulate the market while another individual has so few votes as to be unable to make any impact whatsoever, the democracy of the market is dead. This means that truly libertarian markets require rules and regulations that lead to something approximately like pure competition with an egalitarian distribution of wealth. Of course, we live in an imperfect world, so pure competition and pure equality is impossible, but we can approximate such things. The closer we are to pure competition, the better. Widespread distribution of wealth with mild inequality is far better than all land and capital being concentrated into the hands of a few elite individuals while the rest are left subservient to the rentier class.
Dialectical Libertarianism
Dialectical libertarianism interests me because I came to radical centrism from radical libertarianism. Dialectical libertarianism is not necessarily a centrist position but it is a way of thinking about politics that does seem to justify a more centrist stance from a libertarian perspective.
A dialectical libertarian insists that we must not look exclusively at whether or not an action or policy is formally libertarian. Instead, we must examine every action and policy and the role it plays within the framework of the existing system. Imposing a new law is always formally anti-liberty, but imposing a new law that restricts abuses of special privileges granted by previous laws can by functionally libertarian. Suppose that the government grants a certain company a monopoly on some commodity. However, the company starts charging monopoly prices, so government decides to impose a price control. The primary intervention of establishing the monopoly is anti-libertarian, while the secondary intervention of regulating the monopoly in order to make prices be more similar to what we might expect in a free market is actually functionally libertarian.
As a dialectical libertarian, one doesnât care whether an act or policy is formally libertarian. One only cares if it has an emancipatory effect. Given the history of government-backed cisheteropatriarchal white supremacy in our country, anti-discrimination law is libertarian in the context of this society, whereas the âfreedomâ to discriminate is fascist. Given the structural problems that create poverty, homelessness, and lack of access to healthcare within our society, social welfare programs that guarantee access to food, shelter, and healthcare are functionally libertarian.
Conclusion: A Call to Radical Centrism
As radical centrists, we not only recognize the key components of the basic structure of the Great Society; we also recognize that the society in which we live is far from having such a basic structure. Yes, we do have democracy and some semblance of a welfare state and redistribution, but the democracy needs serious reform in a participatory direction and the economy needs serious reform as well. As radical centrists, we demand not just the amelioration of the human condition under the existing political and economic system, but the wholesale elimination of poverty and domination. We demand that all people be guaranteed access to food, shelter, education, and healthcare. We demand that all people have access to clean air, water, and an environment that is not devastated by ecological catastrophe. We are centrists, but we are radical centrists. The demands that we are making are quite radical!